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[In this article, the author makes the serious point that labour laws based 
upon the “corporations power” under the Australian Constitution will be 
centred around corporations to the detriment of flesh and blood persons 
who interact with corporations.  Wholesome labour laws seek to balance 
the rights, duties and obligations of employers and employees as equal le-
gal actors in the processes of work and production.  However, general la-
bour laws of broad application which would be required to found a 
national labour regime, which were enacted in reliance upon the corpora-
tions power, could not for long maintain this balance between employers 
and employees.  In the fullness of time, these labour laws will become little 
more than a sub-set of corporations law, because inevitably they will fas-
ten upon the economic needs of corporations and their employees will be 
viewed as but one aspect of the productive process in our globalized econ-
omy.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This article is dedicated to my friend and mentor Professor Emeritus Harry Glasbeek whose 1970 
industrial law classes at Melbourne’s Monash University charted my life’s course as a labour law teacher 
and writer. 
** Blake Dawson Waldron Professor in Industrial Law, University of Sydney.  This article is derived 
from a presentation which I made at the 46th Annual Conference of the Industrial Relations Society of 
New South Wales on Friday 13 May 2005.  I wish to thank Michael Rawling and Joellen Riley for their 
assistance with this paper, and also my wife Mary Crock for her steadfast encouragement of my work. 
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I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Australian Constitution which embodies our federal compact is of central 
importance because it sets forth the manner in which our parliaments, courts and 
cabinets operate within the Australian polity.  To this end, our Constitution estab-
lishes our federal form of Government, and its first three chapters set forth the 
Commonwealth's legislative, executive and judicial powers respectively.   
 
As background, I wish to focus upon the manner in which the Constitution divides 
up the power to make laws between our federal, State and Territory governments 
because an understanding of this legislative division of powers is essential in order 
to fully comprehend the operation of our federal and State labour laws.  Put briefly, 
our Constitution divides up the legislative power by specifying a list of subjects on 
which the Australian Parliament may enact laws.  Any subjects which fall outside 
this list are exclusively available to the State parliaments.  The major subjects on 
which the Australian Parliament may enact laws are set out in section 51 of the 
Constitution.  However, the subjects enumerated in section 51 are not exclusively 
within the domain of the Australian Parliament.  Rather, they are concurrent in the 
sense that the State parliaments may make laws on any of the section 51 subjects, 
but by virtue of section 109 of the Constitution,1 any federal laws will trump any 
existing State Laws.  In constitutional parlance, a federal law will override any 
inconsistent State laws and the High Court of Australia has given a broad interpre-
tation to inconsistency in its jurisprudence.2   
 
We are all very aware of the nature of the legislative divide between the Common-
wealth and the States.  We know that marriage, divorce,3 immigration4 and taxa-
tion5 are subjects on which the Commonwealth has enacted laws, and we also 
appreciate that the rules of the road, the buying and selling of property and the 
general criminal laws are within the legislative provinces of the States.  However, I 
suspect that we are far less aware of the manner in which the very wording of the 
specified federal legislative powers actually shape the laws enacted in reliance on 
these powers.  Put briefly, the listed federal legislative powers can be likened to a 
form of DNA.  Just as we pass on our DNA to our children, the words of every 
specified head of federal power shape the laws enacted in reliance on it.  As I shall 
more fully explain in a few moments, the wording of the labour power which is set 
out in section 51 of the Constitution, has shaped federal labour law by its focus on 
industrial disputes and by its requirement that their settlement must occur either 
through conciliation or arbitration.  My argument is that the enumerated heads of 
legislative power which are chosen by the current Government to expand its labour 
1 Section 109 of the Constitution provides: “When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the 
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid.” 
2 Clyde Engineering v Cowburn, (1926) 37 CLR 466; Ex Parte Mclean, (1930) 43 CLR 472; University 
of Wollongong v Metwally, (1984) 56 ALR 1. 
3 Section 51 (xxii) of the Constitution. 
4 Section 51(xxvii) of the Constitution. 
5 Section 51(ii) of the Constitution. 
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law jurisdiction after July 2005, will have consequences on the shape and nature of 
these new federal labour laws.  In particular, if the Howard Government seeks to 
establish one national labour law regime through primarily relying upon the corpo-
rations power, this will in the fullness of time, inevitably lead to labour law becom-
ing a sub-set of corporations law. In truth, we will be witnesses to the 
corporatisation of our labour laws.  
 
We know that for the past century the legislative powers to enact labour laws have 
been divided between the Commonwealth and State parliaments, and this is why we 
currently have six labour law regimes operating in Australia.6  This divided labour 
law jurisdiction has flowed from the fact that the labour power which is set out in 
section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution only gives the Australian Parliament limited 
powers over labour relations, and as presently interpreted by the High Court of 
Australia the power cannot regulate Australia's entire workforce. Section 51(xxxv) 
of the Constitution, enables the federal Parliament to enact laws with respect to 
"Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
extending beyond the limits of any one State".  Shortly put, the labour power limits 
the Commonwealth's legislative powers to the establishment of machinery possess-
ing powers of conciliation and arbitration to prevent and to settle interstate labour 
disputes.  As the labour power has been the major power on which the Australian 
Parliament has relied when enacting its labour laws, the jurisdiction over labour law 
has been necessarily a divided one because industrial disputes which are not inter-
state in character come within the realms of the States.  It is important to appreciate 
that for most of the last century, the High Court of Australia interpreted the labour 
power whereby industrial disputes were confined to disputes where the employees 
and employers were engaged in an industry.  This notion of industry connoted 
either manual labour or some connection to an industrial process.  This meant that 
large areas of white collar employment, as well as school, college and university 
teaching could not come within federal jurisdiction.7  It was not until 1983 that the 
High Court of Australia overturned this unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of 
the labour power in the Australian Social Welfare Union Case.8  In large part, this 
is why for the first 90 years of the twentieth century the Australian Parliament was 
content to share with the States the regulation of labour relations. 
 
What was perhaps not so apparent in the first 90 years of the previous century when 
the federal and State labour regimes were remarkably similar, was the manner in 
which the labour power did shape labour law regulation in our nation. When estab-
6 There is the federal labour law regime and a labour law regime in each of New South Wales, Queen-
sland, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory. 
7 For an understanding of the case law of this period, see RON MCCALLUM AND RICHARD TRACEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INDUSTRIAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 16-59 (1980). 
8 R v Coldham; Ex Parte Australian Social Welfare Union, (1983) 153 CLR 297. For detailed discussion 
see W Rothnie, Restoring the Frontiers of an Unruly Province: Inter–Governmental Immunities and 
Industrial Disputes, 11 MON. UNI. L. REV. 120 (1985);  P McDonald, The Meaning of Industrial Dis-
putes in Section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution: R v Coldham and Ors; Ex Parte the Australian Social 
Welfare Union,10 SYDNEY L. REV. 239–252 (1984); and Ron McCallum, Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Downunder: New Directions in Australian Federal Labour Law, 6 COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW 94–108 
(1984). 
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lished in the early 1900's, the federal and most of the State systems had as their 
centrepieces courts of compulsory conciliation and arbitration which were later 
replaced by industrial relations commissions.  Either industrial disputes were initi-
ated or demands were made by trade unions which were resolved when conciliation 
failed by final and binding interest arbitration.  The labour courts and tribunals used 
award regulation mainly on an industry basis to bestow wage rates and terms and 
conditions of employment on employees.  After 1990 when our federal and State 
labour law mechanisms began to diverge, the manner by which federal labour laws 
had been shaped by the words of the labour power became clearer.  The labour 
power requires the existence of an industrial dispute, or at the very least a situation 
which might give rise to an industrial dispute.  Labour peace must be achieved by 
agreement, perhaps after conciliation, and independent arbitration is the only 
method of ending deadlocks.  Furthermore, the 1956 and 1957 decisions of the 
High Court of Australia9 and the Privy Council10 in the Boilermakers Case meant 
that under federal labour law arbitral and judicial functions had to be undertaken by 
separate institutions.  In brief, the Boilermakers rulings prohibited federal courts 
which exercise federal judicial powers from at one and the same time exercising 
arbitral powers of an administrative character.  However, it is essential to appreciate 
that the focus of the labour power on securing industrial peace has always meant 
that the terms and conditions of employment of employees are at its very heart. 
 
II EXPANDING FEDERAL LABOUR LAW JURISDICTION 
Over the last one hundred years, but more especially in the last decade and a half, 
the Australian Parliament has endeavoured to increase the breadth of its labour law 
powers as embodied in the labour power by relying on other heads of constitutional 
power.  For example, the trade and commerce power11 has long been used to enact 
labour laws covering sailors, waterside workers and airline crews. These special 
labour laws were constitutionally supported because the terms and conditions of 
these employees and employers were regarded as an aspect of interstate and over-
seas trade and commerce.12  In these areas of regulation, the trade and commerce 
power was used as an ancillary power because it could enable tribunal regulation 
without the jurisdictional requirement of an interstate labour dispute and it still 
supports regulation of these industries pursuant to the Workplace Relations Act 
1996.13  The trade and commerce power when used in this manner, did not alter the 
shape of our federal labour laws which remained focused upon the resolution of 
group contests through conciliation and arbitration which lead to award regulation. 
 
9 The Queen v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia, (1956) 94 CLR 254 
10 Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v The Queen and the Boilermakers’ Society of Australia, [1957] 
AC 288. 
11 Section 51(i). This power allows the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to “Trade 
and Commerce with other countries, and among the States”. 
12 David McCann, First Head Revisited: A Single Industrial Relations System under the Trade and 
Commerce Power, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 75 (2004). 
13 Sections 5–5AA of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).  
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In 1993, the Keating Labour Government sought to dramatically broaden its labour 
law powers by utilising its power to make laws with respect to external affairs.14  
This head of power enables the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate about the 
subject-matter of a treaty or convention which has been signed or ratified by the 
Australian Government.15  Prime Minister Keating called in aid various Interna-
tional Labour Organization conventions as a means of expanding federal labour law 
jurisdiction. The Keating Government chose to rely upon the external affairs power 
because it could use International Labour Organization conventions to reshape 
federal labour law.  After all, these conventions were collectivist in nature, they 
strictly adhere to the principal of trade union participation in labour relations mat-
ters and they would enhance various collectivist aspects of federal labour law.  As 
is well known, in order to establish an unfair dismissal regime which could poten-
tially cover the Australian workforce, the Keating Government chose the Interna-
tional Labour Organization 1982 Termination of Employment Convention16 on 
which to base these laws.17  However, this convention which was designed to make 
it more difficult for employers to shed labour during economic downturns, was a 
wholly inappropriate vehicle for these laws which, in the end, were unsuited and 
unsatisfactory for Australia.18  In my view, the community dissatisfaction with 
these unfair dismissal laws was one of the reasons why the Keating Government 
lost office in March 1996. 
 
In late 1996, the Howard Government relied on the reference of powers clause to 
take over the vast bulk of the labour law regime of the State of Victoria.  Under the 
reference of powers provision which is set out in section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitu-
tion,19 the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate on the subject-matter of any 
powers which a State has referred to it.  In this instance, the Kennett Victorian 
Government referred the vast bulk of its labour law private sector powers to the 
Commonwealth Parliament.20  In this instance, however, the Howard Government 
enacted separate laws to govern these Victorian workers which had been brought 
within its realm, and actually specified minimum terms and conditions of employ-
ment which were less favourable than those which federal labour law bestowed on 
14 Section 51(xxix) allows the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to “External 
Affairs”. 
15 Mary Crock, Federalism and the External Affairs Power, 14 MELB. UNI. LAW REV. 238 (1983). 
16 ILO CONVENTION (NO. 158) CONCERNING TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE 
EMPLOYER, opened for signature 22 June 1982, ATS 1994 No. 4 (entered into force 23 November 1985). 
17 See the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Commonwealth) Part VIA, Division 3, now repealed. These 
provisions were inserted into the Industrial Relations Act by the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 
(Commonwealth). 
18 For comment, see Ron McCallum, Collective Labour Law, Citizenship and the Future, 22 MELB. UNI.. 
L. REV.  37 (1998). 
19 Section 51(xxxvii) allows the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to “Matters 
referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, 
but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred or which 
afterwards adopt the law”. 
20 Stuart Kollmorgen, Towards a Unitary National System of Industrial Relations? Commonwealth 
Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996 (Vic); Workplace and Other Legislation Amendment Act (No.2) 
1996 (Commonwealth), 10 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 158 (1997). 
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employees under general award regulation.21  Although this two tiered arrangement 
was done away with by January 2005, this ill-advised strategy was, I venture to 
think, one of the reasons why the Kennett Government of Victoria lost office in late 
1999.  I would be surprised if any State decided to proceed down this path on its 
own in the near future, unless it could ensure that the federal Parliament would not 
in any way differentiate between workers under its general labour laws and these 
newly acquired employees.  However, references of powers are not uncommon, and 
currently references of powers by the States support the federal Corporations Act 
2001 together with aspects of the federal family law regime.  If used as an aspect of 
a cooperative federal and State plan to unify aspects of labour law, such references 
of powers would be a useful tool. 
 
As the corporations power is on everyone's lips, it is worthy of a more detailed 
examination.  The power of the Australian Parliament to enact laws with respect to 
"Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the 
limits of the Commonwealth" which is set out in section 51(xx) of the Constitution 
has also been used to increase federal labour law power. In 1971, the High Court of 
Australia revised its previously narrow interpretation of the corporations power and 
decided that it would support laws directly applying to corporations and to persons 
engaging in conduct with corporations.22  In 1977, the Fraser Government used this 
power to outlaw trade union secondary boycott activities against corporations.23  In 
1993, the Keating Government used the corporations power as an ancillary measure 
to establish non-union collective agreements known as enterprise flexibility agree-
ments.  It was obliged to use the corporations power because the labour power 
could not support such non-union agreements which are not related to industrial 
disputes initiated by federally registered trade unions.  As the labour power re-
mained at centre stage, this 1993 use of the corporations power did not significantly 
reshape federal labour law. 
 
Finally, in 1996 the Howard Government made extensive use of the corporations 
power to uphold aspects of the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The corporations 
power currently upholds laws granting remedies for unfair dismissals by incorpo-
rated employers, enabling incorporated employers to enter into collective agree-
ments either with or without trade unions and which permit incorporated employers 
to make statutory agreements between employers and individual employees which 
are known as Australian workplace agreements.  While the corporations power has 
been extensively used for these purposes since 1996, the labour power still plays an 
important role in upholding our labour laws, in the main because it validates the 
laws which empower the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to promulgate 
minimum wages and other minimum terms and conditions of employment which 
make up its award-based employee safety net.  I venture to think, however, that one 
of the reasons why the Howard Government moved significant aspects of labour 
21 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), Part XV. 
22 Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd. (1971)124 CLR 468.  
23 See now Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45D, 45DA, 45DB, 45DC, 45DC,45DD, 45E,45EA and 
45EB. 
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regulation from the labour power to the corporations power was because of the 
manner in which the labour power has shaped our labour laws.  After all, the labour 
power requires for all practical purposes the involvement of trade unions in settling 
labour disputes, whereas the Howard Government wished to reshape federal labour 
law by emphasizing individual bargaining and direct bargaining between employers 
and their employees without intervention from trade unions. 
 
III ONE NATIONAL LABOUR LAW SYSTEM 
There are strong arguments24 in favour of the establishment of one truly national 
labour law regime for Australia with its relatively small population.  Suffice to say 
that the pressures of economic globalization coupled with advances in information 
technology, mean that we should work towards developing one national labour law 
regime in the next decade.  However, the problems and inconveniences in having 
federal and State labour law mechanisms operating simultaneously, is not a major 
handicap which is slowing down labour productivity.  I venture to believe that the 
immediate dissolution of our dual labour law mechanisms is not of such an urgent 
nature which would require the use by our federal Parliament of extraordinary 
legislative and constitutional measures.  After all, under our current federal labour 
laws, any employers which are trading or financial or foreign corporations, that is 
the vast bulk of incorporated employers, may already enter into union and non-
union certified agreements or conclude Australian workplace agreements with their 
employees.  The fact that very many incorporated employers still choose to operate 
under State labour laws, puts the lie to any urgency in this matter. 
 
There is much life left in the labour power which can be utilized when developing a 
cooperative national labour law system.  In the Industrial Relations Act Case of 
1996, for example, the High Court of Australia upheld enterprise bargaining be-
tween single business employers and trade unions pursuant to the labour power.25  
In 2000, the High Court of Australia handed down its decision in the Pacific Coal 
Case.26  This decision upheld the Howard Government's award simplification 
process through a flexible and pragmatic reading of the labour power.  In my view, 
what is required is cooperation between the federal, State and Territory govern-
ments to enact one system for all Australian employees.  Therefore, federal and 
State cooperation is by far the best method of bringing about a truly national labour 
law.  Unfortunately, insufficient efforts have been made by either level of govern-
ment on this front and Australian employees and business enterprises deserve much 
stronger efforts in this regard from our politicians. 
 
24 PETER REITH, BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK:  TOWARDS A SIMPLER NATIONAL WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
SYSTEM, THREE DISCUSSION PAPERS, (2000) DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
AND SMALL BUSINESS, CANBERRA;  George Williams, The First Step to a National Industrial Relations 
Regime? Workplace Relations Amendment (Termination of Employment) Bill 2002, 16 AUSTRALIAN 
JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 94 (2003). 
25 Victoria v Commonwealth, (1996) 187 CLR 416, 537–539. 
26 Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd: Ex Parte CFMEU, (2000) 203 CLR 346. 
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IV THE CORPORATISATION OF AUSTRALIAN LABOUR LAW 
Instead of adopting a cooperative approach with the States to create a truly national 
labour law regime, in a statement to Parliament on 26 May 2005, Prime Minister 
John Howard made it clear that his Government would use the corporations power 
to enact a national set of labour laws which would override the labour laws of the 
States at least with respect to incorporated employers.27 In this statement, the Prime 
Minister also announced sweeping changes to federal industrial laws.  No longer 
will the Australian Industrial Relations Commission be empowered to set a mini-
mum wage, instead this will be done by a new body titled the Australian Fair Pay 
Commission.  Certified agreements and Australian workplace agreements will be 
approved by the Office of the Employment Advocate.  The "no disadvantage" test 
will be abolished and will be replaced by four minimum conditions of employment 
and a minimum wage.  These minimum conditions are annual leave, unpaid paren-
tal leave, sick and bereavement leave, and ordinary hours of work. Finally, the 
unfair dismissal laws will no longer be available to employees under federal labour 
law per se.  Rather, these protective laws will only be available to employees whose 
incorporated employers employ at least one hundred workers.  
 
If the Howard Government makes an extensive use of the corporations power and 
enacts labour laws which override those of the States with respect to incorporated 
employers, then in my view these laws could cover approximately three quarters of 
the private sector workforce.  From my reading of the jurisprudence of both the 
High Court of Australia and the Federal Court of Australia, the corporations power 
would support national laws governing certified agreements, protected and unpro-
tected industrial action, Australian workplace agreements, unfair dismissals, mini-
mum wage rates and minimum terms and conditions of employment, at least for 
incorporated employers. 
 
It is clear that the major head of constitutional power which the Howard Govern-
ment will rely upon to uphold these national labour relations laws will be the corpo-
rations power.  The labour power would play a speedily diminishing ancillary role 
in such a regime.  Just as the words of the labour power shaped twentieth century 
federal labour law, it would be the words of the corporations power which would 
inevitably shape the labour laws of this current century.  Within a relatively short 
space of time, Australian labour law would become little more than a sub-set of 
corporations law, and this will inevitably lead to the corporatisation of Australian 
labour law.   
 
27  Mr John Howard, Prime Ministerial Statement Workplace Relations Parliament of Australia, 26 May 
2005, available at  
<http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Category/PolicyReviews/WorkplaceRelationsReforms/Prime
Ministerialstatement.htm> (last visited Jul. 4, 2005). 
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It may be conceded by some readers that the detailed prescription which is to be 
found in the words of the labour power concerning the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes etc has shaped federal labour law.  However, they may ask how 
can the broad words of the corporations power shape the laws which rely upon it for 
their validity.  In other words, how can the words "Foreign corporations, and trad-
ing or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth", shape 
a host of enacted laws and any forthcoming labour laws.  My answer to this ques-
tion lies in the very nature of the corporations power.  Most of the enumerated 
heads of legislative power in the Constitution are purposive in nature.  For example, 
the Australian Parliament may enact legislation for the purposes of trade and com-
merce, for the purposes of taxation, for the purposes of the defence of Australia, for 
the purposes of preventing and settling interstate industrial disputes etc.28  How-
ever, the corporations power is not purposive in nature.  Rather, the corporations 
power may more aptly be described as an object power because for a law to be valid 
it must fasten upon the object of the corporation.  Put another way, the corporations 
power does not permit the Australian Parliament to enact laws for the purposes of 
corporations generally.  According to the case law, the corporations power will only 
support laws which apply directly to corporations, or to persons and bodies who 
engage in conduct with corporations.29  In other words, a law which merely pre-
scribed a minimum wage for employees per se would not be a valid law under the 
corporations power because the law is of general application.  On the other hand, a 
law which prescribed a minimum wage which incorporated employers were bound 
to pay their employees would be valid because it specifically related to the obliga-
tions of corporations and to the rights of their employees who engage in conduct 
with corporations through their employment relationship. 
 
In the Kingsley Laffer lecture30 which I delivered in April 2005 at the University of 
Sydney, I used the following playful example to illustrate how the corporations 
power shapes laws enacted in reliance upon it.  Suppose, I said, that section 51 of 
the Constitution contained a head of legislative power enabling the federal Parlia-
ment to make laws with respect to "Men".  We might call this power the men’s' 
power which like the corporations power would be an object power.  This power, I 
suggested, would uphold laws enabling men and women to enter into, or to dissolve 
marriages with one another.  These laws would be valid because they related to men 
specifically, and they would be valid with respect to women because in marrying 
28 Section 51(i), (ii), (vi) and (xxxv). 
29 Re Dingjan: Ex Parter Wagner, (1995) 183 CLR 323; Quickenden v O’Connor and Ors, (2001) 109 
FCR 243. For comment on the scope of the corporations power, see Bill Ford, Reconstructing Australian 
Labour Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 10 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 1 (1997); 
GEORGE WILLIAMS, LABOUR LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 104-125 (1998); Andrew Stewart, Federal 
Labour Law and New Uses for the Corporations Power, 14 Australian Journal of Labour Law 145 
(2001);  MARILYN PITTARD AND RICHARD NAUGHTON, AUSTRALIAN LABOUR LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS  522–540 (4th ed, 2003); George Williams, The First Step to a National Industrial Relations 
Regime?  Workplace Relations Amendment (Termination of Employment) Bill 2002, 16 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 94 (2003), and BREEN CREIGHTON  & ANDREW STEWART, LABOUR LAW 105-
108 (4th ed, 2005). 
30 RON MCCALLUM, KINGSLEY LAFFER MEMORIAL LECTURE 11 APRIL 2005, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, 
JUSTICE AT WORK: INDUSTRIAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CORPORATISATION OF LABOUR LAW. 
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and divorcing men, women would be engaging in conduct with men.  As I further 
explained in the Kingsley Laffer lecture, we would find that just as marital laws 
based on a men’s power would be unbalanced in nature, so in time would labour 
laws be unbalanced in a similar manner. 
 
To some this example may appear to be frivolous, however, I have used it to make a 
serious point which is that laws based upon the corporations power will be centred 
around corporations to the detriment of flesh and blood persons who interact with 
corporations.  Wholesome labour laws seek to balance the rights, duties and obliga-
tions of employers and employees as equal legal actors in the processes of work and 
production.  However, general labour laws of broad application which would be 
required to found a national labour regime, which were enacted in reliance upon the 
corporations power could not for long maintain this balance between employers and 
employees.  In the fullness of time, these labour laws will become little more than a 
sub-set of corporations law because inevitably they will fasten upon the economic 
needs of corporations and their employees will be viewed as but one aspect of the 
productive process in our globalized economy. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, may I leave you with the following thought.  Economic globalization 
has increased the fragility of nation states like Australia because they are more 
vulnerable to the economic pressures of trans-national capital than was previously 
the case.  In truth, nation states like Australia have to share economic power with 
corporations and especially with trans-national corporations.  As government cof-
fers shrink in size through cuts in direct and indirect taxation, the social slack is 
being taken up by the corporate sector.  Not only are corporations engaged in gov-
ernment projects concerning construction and related industries where public pri-
vate partnerships have mushroomed, but in traditional public sectors like the 
management of unemployment and social security, to the running of prisons includ-
ing our immigration detention centres.  If corporate power is further unleashed 
owing to the reshaping of our labour laws into the image of corporate economic 
productivity, the corporate sector will obtain a huge increase in power and influence 
to the great detriment of the Australian nation and especially to the long-term dis-
advantage of working women and men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
